THE RISE OF SHARI'A MOVEMENTS
IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

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Abstrak


Kata kunci: hukum Islam, peraturan daerah syar'i'ah, formalisasi syar'i'ah, gerakan syar'i'ah, Islam politik

Abstract

Since the issuance of regional autonomy law in 1999, there have been approximately 52 districts that have officially issued regional regulation inspired by shari’a, varying from the obligation to wear Muslim garb to the regulation of zakat (religious tax). In fact, based on the law, religious affairs are not the authority of local governments. The central government seems powerless or indifferent in preventing this phenomenon of religious formalization due to the lack of political will among political elites. This paper will explore the new challenges for the democratization process in Indonesia’s current situation and predictions for the future of Indonesian Muslims. There are two main issues which will be addressed here: a) the arguments for and against shari’a regional regulations; and b) the new challenges of democratization among the Indonesian Muslim majority. Some argue that the adoption of shari’a formalization threatens democratization and pluralism in Indonesia, since it can be the ‘time bomb’ within the diversity of Indonesian society. Furthermore, I will closely examine this assumption by public responses on pluralism and tolerance.

Keywords: shari’a law, shari’a regional regulations, formalization of shari’ah, shari’a movements, political Islam
A. Introduction

This paper is adapted from one of the chapters in my thesis. Here I will highlight the opinions for and against the implementation of shari’ā regional regulations (SRRs) in Indonesia. As already known, the rise of the number of SRRs cannot be separated from the democratisation which took place accompanied by the decentralization process in this country. On 1 January 2001, former president Habibie officially issued two important laws for the reorganisation and the restructuring of the balance between the central and regional governments; Law No. 22/1999 on Otonomi Daerah (UU Otoda, Local Autonomy Law) and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal balancing between the central and local government.

Since that time, the Indonesian political system has changed immensely, from central to de-central governance. The central government has given authority to the local government concerning matters of education and culture, employment, health, public works, agriculture, transportation, trade and industry, capital investment, and koperasi (co-operative enterprise).\(^1\)

However, there are five fields of authority that are not mandated to the local government under autonomy policies which are foreign affairs, defence and security, justice, monetary and fiscal policy, and religious affairs, as stated in article 10 subsection 3 UU no.32/2004 in the Local Autonomy law.\(^2\) The reason why religious matters are not decentralized is because the central government considers them triggers for intolerance, social conflict and discrimination within the multi-cultural and religious diversity of the country.

Nonetheless, there have been a significant number of regions with a Muslim majority that have implemented regional regulations influenced by shari’ā, and one district in Monokwari of the Papua province which has enacted regional regulation influenced by the Bible. The central government seems powerless if not indifferent in preventing this phenomenon of religious formalisation. The central governance’s indifference is probably caused by the lack of political will among the DPR RI. Theoretically, the rise of the religious regulations can be easily annulled by the Ministry of Home Affairs because it is in contradiction with the higher hierarchy of law (UU no.32/2004). Moreover, the long period of centralized power in the New Order era has led those regions to excessively show their local power and identity or ‘over-decentralization.’

Before continuing the discussion, Henk Schulte Nordholt’s argument should be taken consideration. He said that:

\begin{quote}
A shift from centralized to a decentralized government is not synonymous with a shift from authoritarian to democratic rule nor does it automatically imply a shift from a strong state towards a strong civil society. The weakening of central state does not automatically, in other words, result in more local democracy. On the contrary, decentralization can under certain condition be accompanied by authoritarian rule.\(^3\)
\end{quote}
Dealing with this, the paper will explore the new challenges for the democratisation process in Indonesia’s current situation and predictions for the future. There are two main issues which will be discussed here: a) the arguments for and against shari’a regional regulations; and b) the new challenges of democratisation among the Indonesian Muslim majority. Some argue that the adoption of shari’a formalisation threatens democratisation and pluralism in Indonesia, since it can be the ‘time bomb’ ready to explode within the diversity of Indonesian society. In the following sections I will closely examine this assumption.

**B. Pro and Contra of Shari’a Implementation**

Since the issuance of Otoda law no. 22/1999, which was revised by UU no. 32/2004, approximately 52 districts/municipalities have officially issued regional regulations inspired by shari’a, varying from the obligation to wear Muslim garb, the requirement for students and civil servants to be able to recite al-Qur’an, the prohibition of the sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages, to the regulation of zakat (religious tax). Regarding this issue there are arguments for and against the enactment of shari’a laws. They both refer to democracy and the Otoda law to support their arguments.

The proponents of regulations prescribed by shari’a mostly rely on three arguments. The first one concerns decadence and morality. The proponents argue that secular law has failed in constructing good morality, and it is because of this that Indonesia faces a multidimensional crisis ranging from immorality and vice, to corruption and the economic crisis. Interestingly, some regencies claim that the rates of crime and prostitution have sharply decreased after the implementation of shari’a regional regulations. The former Bupati of Bulukumba, Andi Patabai Pabokari, even claimed that shari’a local regulations have succeeded in increasing the Pendapatan Asli Daerah (PAD, the Genuine Regional Income) of the Bulukumba district by nine times; decreased theft rates from 78 cases to none, and also decreased the number of rape cases from 41 to none.

The second argument concerns Indonesia’s legal political system. Under the UU Otoda no.32/2004, local governments are permitted to enact regulation based on their own local characteristics. Mutanmimul Ula, DPR member from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), clarified that the Otoda Law provides the authority for the Head of Regions to pass by-laws. He asserted that local governments therefore have the right to enact and implement shari’a regulations in local districts. This argument seems to be in paradox with article 14, subsection 3 of the Otoda laws, but this will be discussed in more detail later. Ula also commented that there are two formal ways to establish shari’a in Indonesia; through constitutional amendment and via the legislation process. The former is much more difficult to achieve because it is always faced with strong resistance in the national parliament, like the case of the Jakarta Charter, whereas the latter is easier if it is performed in the form of regional regulations.

The third argument concerns democratic legislation. The rise in the number of shari’a regional regulations is the result of the acts of democratically elected local leaders (DPRD, Gubernur, Bupati, and Walikota). The proponents argue that as long as it is legislated through a democratic process, there is no reason to reject the existence of shari’a regional regulations. Patrialis Akbar, a member of the DPR RI from the PAN fraction, said that these shari’a regional regulations do not contradict with the UUD; on the contrary, they strongly
support the spirit of the UUD and Pancasila which have affirmed religion and morality as the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state as written in article 29 (1) UUD 1945 and the first principle of the Pancasila about belief in one Supreme God. He commented that these regional regulations were issued through a democratic procedure and if within sixty days after the issuance there is no response from the Department of Home Affairs, then the government no longer has the right to revoke it. Overall, Muslims being the majority of the populations is often used as a crucial reason strengthening the proponent’s stance.

In the meantime, the opponents argue that the reasons above are in contradiction with the constitutional system. Todung Mulya Lubis, a high-profile lawyer, has made three remarks about the mushrooming of the SRRs. First, although these regulations only apply to the Muslim community, they have a tendency to lead to social discrimination and threaten religious freedom. One example is the case of public services in the Bulukumba district which would not serve women unless they would wear a veil. Second, most of the shari’a regional regulations are redundant because they are already covered by the Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP, penal code) such as gambling, prostitution, and alcohol consumption. Third, the shari’a regulations were officially issued in a democratic process and under the local autonomy law, but it is important to underline that based on the hierarchy of laws, the regional regulations are not allowed to violate national law regulations. In this context, shari’a regulations clearly conflict with the basic principle of law- lex superiori derogate leg inferiori- that lower regulations are not allowed to oppose higher regulations.

Based on UU no. 32/2004 (article 10, subsection 3), religious matters fall under the authority of the central government. In other words, the local governments have hijacked the central government’s authority and opposed the higher laws. Ahmad Suaydy, Executive Director of the Wahid Institute, said that the ambivalent situation of the shari’a regulations can easily be remedied by the President, who has the right to revoke them. The reason why, until these days, these regulations still exist is because the government is aware of the high political cost of revoking the regulations, such as the loss of public trust in the government, and possible political instability. Anies Baswedan, the Research Director of the Indonesian Institute, additionally explained that a regional regulation can only be revoked by the president within the first sixty days after it is issued by the local government (see UU Otoda no. 12/2004).

Regarding this issue, 56 members of the DPR RI have signed the memorandum addressed to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to immediately withdraw the regulations influenced by shari’a. They argued that these types of regulations contradict the constitution and could lead to potentially disintegrating the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI, The Unitary State of Republic Indonesia). In response to this stance, 134 members of the DPR RI opposed the memorandum and declared that shari’a regional regulations should be fully appreciated as part of the democratic process practiced by the local governments. They also created a ‘contra memorandum’ which consisted of ten points. One of them said that ‘demanding that the president revoke within sixty days regional regulations which have already been implemented means demanding that the president act authoritatively, which contradicts democracy and the constitution.’ So far President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
himself has never given any statement concerning the application of SRRs. However, his vice president Jusuf Kalla has made conflicting statements on this issue. At the Congress of Ulama NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) in Surabaya (28 July 2006), he declared that ‘will fully support the stance of the NU that rejects the application of shari’ a regional regulations in several districts,’ whereas on another occasion he said that there is nothing to worry about with regards to the enactment of shari’ a regulations. Kalla’s statement indicates the lack of political will from the government to act upon this issue. The Department of Home Affairs seems to be slow in their response to the issue as well. The implementation of shari’ a regional regulations has even appeared in several other Muslim regions.

Denny Indrayana, an expert in constitutional law, says that some of these regulations are irresponsible in the aspect of legal drafting procedures. He found cases of ‘copy and paste,’ which means the legislatures simply copied the regional regulations from other districts and ignored the public participation (see Law no.10/2004 on Legal Drafting Procedure). There has even been a DPRD which forgot to erase the name of the region they imitated and from where they took the shari’ a regional regulation, such as the case in Depok where they copied the anti-vice and anti-alcoholic beverages regulations of the Tangerang district.

At the moment, the shari’ a proponents prefer to use the term perda tertib sosial (social order regulation) rather than the term shari’ a itself. Indrayana thinks that the alteration is deliberately designed to avoid possible contradiction with higher level law or the constitution, so that there is no longer a reason for the opponents of the shari’ a to demand from the central government to annul them. The DPR RI members also ‘agreed to disagree’ (deciding to end the discussion on the differences in opinion) on the controversy surrounding the shari’ a regulations in a parliament session in July 2006, in order not to let the conflict escalate at a grassroots level. Hidayat Nurwahid, chairman of the MPR, affirmed that ‘if someone considers SRRs to be in contradiction with the Constitution, then he can propose a judicial review to the Mahkamah Konstitusi (the Constitutional Court) or the Mahkamah Agung (Supreme Court, Indonesia’s highest court). Do not involve the President by asking him to act authoritarian such as in the New Order era.’

Meanwhile, one can argue that this political consensus was the first resurgence of Muslim formalism in winning the hearts of the people since the collapse of the New Order, which was followed by the legislation of the pornography bill two years later.

C. Analyzing Democratisation and The Future of Indonesian Muslims

Based on data from Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS, Statistics Indonesia) 2001, Indonesia has 177.53 million Muslims out of a total population of 201.242 million people (88.22 percent). This number has made Indonesia the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. As known the Muslim formalist movements have been growing since the resignation of Soeharto. They are small groups, but very vocal, and they disproportionately succeed in grabbing public attention concerning the issues of shari’ a formalisation such as the Jakarta Charter, the law of pornography, and the SRRs. Some argue that the Muslim majority status can be an obstacle and a challenge to the democratisation process at the same time. I will use this section to highlight the research findings from Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat (PPIM, the Centre for Islamic and Society Studies) and Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI, the Indonesian Survey Institute) regarding tolerance, pluralism,
and the satisfaction of the people’s about democratic practices.

What is meant by tolerance here is the willingness to honor and accept everything one rejects or opposes. Though it is not identical with democracy, it is believed to be a crucial component in making democracy work. Within a democratic society, every citizen must be given equal opportunity and rights without looking at their different social, cultural, political, and religious backgrounds. This is why a tolerant attitude is needed to mediate the differences peacefully.

Furthermore, Robert A. Dahl argued that an intolerant attitude frequently occurs in societies primordially divided along religious, ethnic, or regional lines. Indonesia, as it is such a diverse country, would be an interesting subject for further study concerning its degree of tolerance, especially ten years after the reformation. The euphoria of democracy that arose after the downfall of Soeharto can lead to destructive democracy if it is not followed by tolerant attitudes, especially when the elite themselves are intolerant. As Dahl stated:

*If an increase in political activity brings the authoritarian-minded into the political arena, the consensus on the basic norms among the politically active must certainly be declining ... In the light of all this we cannot assume that an increase in participation is always associated with an increase in democracy.*

Additionally, the major danger of political participation during a democratic transition is the potential for ‘tyranny of the majority,’ where the largest group utilises its majority to promote its special interests at the expense of the minorities. Therefore, because Indonesia is a country with a Muslim-majority, it needs to preserve the spirit of tolerance in order not to be trapped in the tyranny of the majority. Speaking of pluralism and tolerance, it is worth presenting the research findings of the PPIM which measured the level of appreciation and the willingness of people to live together with other groups, especially with those who have different religious beliefs or with those who have different religious understandings and interpretations within certain religious communities.

In general, the results indicate that the ‘Islamic education community’ in Indonesia fails to disseminate tolerant attitudes. This can be illustrated by the significant number of respondents who agree and strongly agree to the following statements: ‘Every Muslim is obliged to sermonize to non-Muslims or kaifir (infidels)’ (73 percent); ‘Muslims communities are the best communities compared to non-Muslims’ (92.5 percent); ‘Any member of a Muslim family is forbidden to marry a non-Muslim’ (85.7 percent); ‘Any member of a Muslim family is allowed to marry a non-Muslim only after the latter has converted to Islam’ (88 percent); ‘The main criteria for a good future husband or wife is his or her level of commitment to practicing religious teachings and commands’ (94.6 percent); ‘Muslims are forbidden to say assalamu’alaikum and other religious greetings, such as “Merry Christmas,” to non-Muslims’ (73.5 percent); ‘Non-Muslims will never be satisfied until Muslims follow their religion’ (61.6 percent); ‘Islam is the only true religion, therefore non-Muslims should convert to Islam’ (58.7 percent).

Concerning the socio-political and religious issues, the majority of the respondents did not support the right of a non-Muslim to become president (74.9 percent). This is because the position of president is considered to be strategic and decisive in determining the social, political, and religious life of the Muslim community. The number of respondents agreeing to a non-Muslim becoming a
teacher in a public school is relatively low (only 19.9 percent), since teachers are considered to be in a very strategic position for passing on the religious doctrines to students which will protect the majority status. Furthermore, low support can also be seen for several other sensitive issues which have frequently become the cause for social conflict in the country. These issues mostly deal with freedom of religious expression, chiefly practices of non-Muslim rituals in Muslim residential places. In this context, a small number of respondents allowed non-Muslims to hold their religious congregation in Muslim predominant areas (20.1 per cent) and 36.2 percent of the respondents allowed Christians or non-Muslims to build their houses of worship in their neighborhoods.²²

The survey above shows that there is still a high degree of intolerance, especially towards non-Muslims. The director of the PPIM, Jajat Burhanudin, said that Islamic teachers’ anti-pluralist views would be reflected in their lessons and will contribute to growing conservatism and radicalism among Muslims in Indonesia. He said: ‘I think they play a key role in promoting conservatism and radicalism among Muslims nowadays. You can no longer say now that conservatism and radicalism only increase on the streets like what has been campaigned by the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, the front of Islamic Defenders), but rather deep within the education (system)’.²³

The reluctance of the Muslim community to live in harmony with other minority groups has become evident from the increasing number of destroyed churches. Based on a survey from CSRC (Center for the Study of Religion and Culture), seventy churches have been destroyed by Muslim groups in several regions that apply shari’a regional regulations such as West Java, Aceh, Bengkulu, Central Java and North Sumatra in the ten years after the Reformation era.²⁴ In addition, most of the groups that were considered deviant from mainstream Islam, such as the Ahmadiyah sect, were also unable to avoid the hatred from Muslim communities; yet we all know that Indonesian society is very diverse, consisting of many religions, ethnicities, cultures and languages. This is why the opponents of Muslim formalists argue that the state laws should be based on an appreciation of pluralism, human rights, and democracy, in order to avoid discrimination and violent conflicts.

Dealing with the issue of shari’a, Islam and democracy in contemporary Indonesia, it is worth mentioning the National survey conducted in 2001 and 2002 by the PPIM. Both show that the number of Indonesian Muslims who are favor of Islamism²⁵ is relatively high,²⁶ 57.8 percent of respondents surveyed in 2001 and 67.0 percent of the respondents in 2002 agree that Islamic government based on the al-Qur’an and Sunnah is best for Indonesia, 61.4 percent in 2001 and 70.8 percent in 2002 agree that the state should require Indonesian Muslims to follow the shari’a, and 46.4 percent in 2001 and 53.7 percent in 2002 agree that ‘the ideals and struggles of Islamic movements or organizations (like FPI, Laskar Jihad, and Darul Islam) to implement the shari’a in the government and society must be supported.’ The increased support in society for the struggle of FPI, Laskar Jihad and Darul Islam is in contrast with the stance of most Muslim leaders and political elite on the national level. They consider that these three organisations are representing the extremist fringe of vigilant activists who must be brought under state control.

In addition, the number of respondents who agree on governmental implementation of Islamic provisions such as hudud (mandatory punishment imposed for crimes against God such as amputation of the hand)²⁷ and rajam (the law of stoning for married Muslim
adulteress) was also relatively high. There were 33.0 percent in 2002 who agreed that the hudud law must be implemented by the government and 39.2 percent in 2001 agree that the rajam law must be implemented in our country. Furthermore, 12.9 percent of the respondents in 2001 and 30.2 percent in 2002 agree that the police must ensure that Muslims fast during Ramadan.

Although the survey of the PPIM indicates a high rate of anti-pluralism attitudes, similarly favoring Islamism, based on another PPIM survey in 2006 the number of people supporting democracy was also high. 85.95 percent of the respondents agreed that the best system of governance for Indonesia is democracy. This corresponds with the high rate of respondents rejecting the opinion that democracy is the cause of political instability (80.76%), the source of bad economic development (77.86%), and the cause of decision-making process difficulties (63.2%). The majority of the respondents (82.75%) support the opinion that democracy creates social order within society and 80.05% agree that free and peaceful competition between political parties will improve the quality of government in the country.28

Likewise, the survey of the LSI (2001-2006) shows that the degree of satisfaction of the people with the implementation of democracy had notably increased. The public was asked how satisfied they were with the democratic practices in the country. Before the 2004 general elections, people’s satisfaction was below 50 percent, but after that it has always been over 50 percent. This is a positive indicator of democratic consolidation in Indonesia. Even so, it should be noted that the rate of people satisfied with democracy is 51 percent in 2001-2006, the rest was still unsatisfied. This dissatisfaction can bring about intolerant practices and non-democratic politics (see the following graphic).29

![People’s Satisfaction with the Democratic Process in Indonesia (%)](chart.png)


At the same time, concerning the state ideology and public response on shari’a regional regulations, the majority of Indonesians from Aceh to Papua are still committed to Pancasila as the state ideology.30 The LSI survey states that 69.6 percent of the respondents agreed that the system of government in Indonesia should be based on Pancasila. Those who wanted Indonesia to follow a Western democratic model were only 3.5 percent, whereas those who wanted Indonesia to be an Islamic state such as in the Middle East were only 11.5 percent. Even the Muslim communities themselves (67.4 percent) prefer Pancasila as the state ideology compared to the Western style and the Middle East state model. This is because Pancasila is considered more appropriated for the existing religious, ethnic and cultural diversity of Indonesia. It originates from Indonesia’s own traditional, cultural and historical roots.

The high degree of intolerance, support for Islamism, and the rise of the people’s satisfaction with democratic practices and Pancasila found by PPIM and LSI above demonstrate the complexity of the attitude of Indonesian Muslims when responding to the challenges of modernity and democracy in this country. On one hand, they
support the general idea of shari’a, but on the other, they also support the system of government based on Pancasila and democracy. Additionally, theoretically, the low level of tolerance in society can threaten the democratisation process, but so far the degree of democratisation keeps increasing in Indonesia. This finding affirms the previous image that the majority of Indonesian Muslims are still moderate, or Muslim democrats as Saiful Mujani called them.

D. Closing Remarks

The rise in the number of SRRs can not be separated from the democratic euphoria and decentralisation process which occurred after the collapse of the New Order. Since the launch of Otoda Law no.22/1999 which was revised by UU no. 32/2004, there have been 52 local governments which have officially implemented SRRs, ranging from the obligation to wear Muslim garb to the requirement for students and civil servants to be able to recite al-Qur’an and regulation of zakat. In response to these regulations, many have challenged their implementation because it is considered to have the potential to threaten minority groups and religious freedom, and it contradicts the UU Otoda article 14 subsection 3 which does not allow the local government to decide on religious matters.

At this moment, the groups that favour the implementation of shari’a regional regulations say that the issuance of SRRs has been democratic. Therefore, there is no reason to reject or revoke them, especially since they have been officially implemented for more than sixty days. It means that if one wants to withdraw them, there is no other way except by proposing a judicial review to Mahkamah Agung. Nevertheless, the opinion of senior lawyer Buyung Adnan Nasution is important to be taken into consideration. He sees that the NKRI adopts democratic constitutionalism which requires all laws to cover the content, soul and spirit of the UUD 1945, not only the literal text. Likewise, the products of the laws are not allowed to discriminatively apply to a certain group only. Apart from the arguments that exist for and against, the survey of the LSI demonstrates that 67.4 per cent of the Muslim communities agreed that Pancasila is the more suitable system of government for Indonesia compared to the Western style and Middle Eastern state model.

Regarding the democratisation process and Indonesian Muslim future, the image of Indonesian Muslim in popular media is rapidly becoming more Islamist and radical. Moreover, the nationwide survey of PPIM in 2001 and 2002 shows that the Islamist political orientation among Indonesian Muslims is relatively high. In 2002, 71 percent of the respondents agreed that the state should require Indonesian Muslims to follow the shari’a, and 67.0 percent stated that an Islamic government based on al-Qur’an and Sunnah is best for Indonesia. However, another survey showed that the majority of the Muslim communities also support the democratic system and Pancasila. This reflects the ambiguous attitude of Muslim respondents. They agree with the idea of Islamic government but also support Pancasila and democratic practices. In conclusion, the majority of Indonesians has a more moderate or religious democratic character than the Islamic ideologists. Despite their agreement on the general idea of shari’a Islam, their opinions on how it should be implemented in this country differ.
Endnotes

2 See the Article 10, subsection 3, UU no. 22/2004.
7 Ibid.
20 The survey was conducted in 2006, it involved 960 respondents (kuail, ustadz, santri) from 64 pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) and 16 Islamic schools in eight provinces throughout Indonesia (West Java, Banten, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, West Sumatra, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara), Jimhari and Jajat Burhanudin, Assessment of Social and Political Attitudes in Indonesian Schools: Madrasah and Pesantren Directors and Students (Jakarta: PPIM UIN Jakarta-2006), p. 23.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
Islamism here is a belief that Islam covers all aspects of human life. It not only deals to the human and God relationship, but also social, economic, and political life.

The 2001 survey covered the populations of sixteen provinces (all provinces in Java plus North Sumatra, West Sumatra, South Sumatra, Lampung, Jambi, Riau, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara); the 2002 survey covered the national population minus Papua and Maluku. The PPIM survey results can be found in R. William Liddle, “New Patterns of Islamic Politics in Democratic Indonesia,” in Piety and Pragmatism: Trends in Indonesia Islamic Politics (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2003), p. 9. For the complete breakdown see the table in appendix.


Jamhari and Jajat Burhanudin, Assessment, p. 16.


The survey was conducted in 33 provinces from Sabang to Merauke on 28 July- 3 August 2006. It used multistage random sampling and interviews which involved 700 respondents. The margin of error is approximately 3.8 per cent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


**News Papers and Document Reports**


**Appendix**  
*Islamic Political Orientations among Indonesian Muslims (%) In 2001 and 2002*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree that Islamic government, i.e. government based on the al-Qur’an and Sunnah under the leadership of Islamic authorities, such as ulama or kiai, is best for a country like ours</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that religion and the state should be separated**</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the state should require all Muslim men and women to abide by the shari’a</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the ideals and struggle of Islamic Movements or Organizations (like Islamic Defenders, Laskar Jihad, Darul Islam, and others) to implement the shari’a in the government and society must be supported</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that in the national election one should only vote for candidates who understand Islamic teachings and attempt to fight for their implementation in national politics</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that in the national election one should vote only for Islamic parties</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that government should prohibit banks from charging or paying interest in all banks in Indonesia</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the law of cutting off the hand of a Muslim thief, as stated in the al-Qur’an and must be implemented by the government in this country</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the law of stoning that is ordered in the al-Qur’an, which is throwing stones at a married Muslim adulteress, must be prohibited in our country, ***</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the police must ensure that Muslims carry out their five daily prayers</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the police must ensure that Muslims fast during Ramadan,****</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that the inheritance of daughters should be half that of sons</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree that men may have more than one wife (polygamy)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disagree, 40.6 %; No opinion, 23 %.

***Disagree, 39.2 %; No opinion, 18.5 %.

****Wording of the 2001 and 2002 surveys is different. The key change is from arresting (menangkap) Muslims who do not fast in 2001 to ensure, or watch over the sense of active surveillance (mengawas), that Muslims fast in 2002.