Remembering the Seven-Word of The Jakarta Charter: The Challenging Risk of Indonesian Today

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Abstract

This article aims to discuss the remembering phenomenon of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter. Even though it happened in early Indonesia independent era, the rejection of deleting the seven words of Jakarta Charter still exists until now. The seven words abolition of the Jakarta Charter became myths and rites that used by Islamic fundamentalist groups to bring back past memories in Indonesia today. In the process, it became a collective or social memory among Muslim Fundamentalist group, and it gives great energy, and also dreaming, to the fundamentalist Islamic groups to struggle to remake Indonesia as Islamic State. In Indonesian history, it is a big problem because of two reasons. Indonesia is not Islamic state. Beside that this group also is not only using constitutional ways, but also unconstitutional ways, such rebellion, religious terror, and hijacking. Therefore, we need to reshape and reconfigure the memory of deleting the seven words of the Jakarta Charter.

Keywords: myths, rites, collective memory, islamic state, jakarta charter

A. Introduction

This paper discusses the deleting phenomenon of seven words “with the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari’a for its adherents” of the Jakarta Charter which is always to be crucial issues since formulated in BPUPKI / PPKI in 1945 until today. This theme is very important to discuss because in the history of Indonesia, the deletion of seven words of the Jakarta Charter became unhappy moment for Islamism groups that want to create Indonesia to be Islamic state. Such seven words give great energy, and also dreaming, to the fundamentalist Islamic groups to struggle in order to remaking Indonesia as Islamic State. In addition, the effort to create their ideas, they not only use constitutional-democratic ways, but also through violence ways, as did by the DI / TII Karto Suwiryo in West Java, Aceh’s rebellion led by Daud Beureuh, and in South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakar. The violence phenomena happened and triggered by that movement made most of
Indonesian, not only non-Muslim as like showed by representatives of East Indonesia in 1945, but also for Muslims themselves life in fear. One indication of the fear of the application of Islamic law can be seen from the defeat of Islamic parties in every election held, beginning in 1955 until 2009.

Having had drifted in the national discourse during the New Order, after the fall of the new order in 1998 seven words of the Jakarta Charter has been requisitioned again. It is signed by the emergence of Islamic parties and fundamentalist Islamic groups that massively urged the government is to returning the seven words of the Jakarta Charter and applying Islamic law. Democratically, the demand to restore the seven words of the Jakarta Charter came back through the debate about the need for amendment of Article 29 UUD 1945 was rolling on the MPR Annual Session in 2000. Two factions of the Islamic party of the Unity Development Party (F-PPP) and the Star Moon Party (F-PBB) in view of their general views insisted to return the seven words of the Jakarta Charter that have been deleted in the body of the 1945 Constitution, particularly article 29. What did by F-PBB and F-PPP got massive support from non-parliament Islamic groups, such as the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, the Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia, the KISDI, and Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI). They do demonstration demanding imposition of Islamic law in Indonesia. Like as the Islamic political parties in Parliament, they urged that the seven words of the Jakarta Charter should be returned. Their demands to return the seven word of the Jakarta Charter are the entrance to apply Islamic law, and finally establish an Islamic state (Ismail, Pijar-Pijar Islam Pergumulan Kultur dan Struktur, 2002, pp. 35-41).

In a democracy realm, what the Islamic parties and Islamic organizations that has the desire and struggle to re-enter the seven words of the Jakarta Charter "with the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari'a for its adherents" are actually legitimate, valid only. In the sense that the Islamic group wants to returning seven word should through constitutional ways. Like trade, the idea to return the seven words of the Jakarta Charter sold their wares to the Indonesian people through their representatives in parliament. Is the merchandise bought or not entirely depends on the community. They should not force the buyers (citizens) to buy their wares. In other words, if citizens do not want to buy their wares, they also have to receive it.

The problems are groups that want to implement Islamic sharia in Indonesia are not merely struggling through constitutional ways, but also, sometimes, through unconstitutional ways, some rebellions and religious violence were supported by religious fervor to make Indonesia to be an Islamic state. There are some episodes of religious violence during the year 2011 and early 2012 that, in my opinion, as part of struggle to create Indonesia to be Islamic state, namely attacking on Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in Cikeusik, Banten (February 7, 2011); riots and
burnings churches in Temanggung, Central Java (8 February 2011); book bomb in Utan Kayu, East Jakarta which cut off the hands of a police officer (March 2011); suicide bombings by Muhammad Syarif Yosoefa in the mosque surrounding police station in Cirebon on Friday (15/4/2011); and burning Syiah Islamic Boarding School at Sampang Madura (December 29, 2011). Such religious violence is to be frightening incident not only to those people who are to directly victim, but also indirectly victim such as the consumer mass media. Religious violence is always aired repeatedly by several television stations in some weeks and became the main menu of print media into for weeks has penetrated the public consciousness of Indonesia and became a kind of collective consciousness. It is not just about how religious violence repeated, but also the effect of it, that has caused tremendous pain. Through television, we can see how a mother was crying hysterically because of the child died, his house vandalized, and burned by the masses that use religious attributes. Little children were crying hysterically in fear to see their parents being beaten. A wife could only shed tears when interviewed by television stations because she was not being able to visit her husband who was dying in hospital because of lack of fees.

Islam in Indonesia has always been defined by tolerance, moderation, and pluralism. In Indonesia Islam helped create the foundations of civil society that made the transition to democracy possible whereas in the Middle East Islam has been seen as anathema to democratization. As Robert Hefner has eloquently argued, Islam was the force that facilitated Indonesia’s transition to democracy. However in other side we also find how Indonesian Islamic fundamentalist use anti-democracy ways to implement Islamic law (shari’a) by changing Indonesia to be Islamic state, or giving Islamic law (shari’a) a constitutional status. The effort giving Islamic law (shari’a) a constitutional status has been undertaken several times after Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August 1945. In that time some Muslim leaders (in June–August 1945) struggled to introduce Jakarta Charter into the constitution 1945. The Jakarta Charter is the first draft of the preamble to that constitution and it contained what has since become a well-known seven-word: (1) dengan (2) kewajiban (3) menjalankan (4) syariat (5) Islam (6) bagi (7) pemeluknya [with the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari’a for its adherents]. This phrase, famous today simply as the ‘seven words,’ was eventually withdrawn from the final draft of the preamble on 18 August 1945. Since then, however, the status of the seven words has been a constantly controversial issue.

How the Jakarta Charter has remained an ongoing issue in Indonesian politics is the struggle that arose during the debates over the most appropriate ideology for the Indonesian state during sessions of the Constituent Assembly from 1957 to 1959. However, for those expecting a profound role for Islam in the modern nation-state,
the struggle ended in failure. A decade later, the call for shari‘a re-emerged in the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) sessions in 1966–1968, only to fail again. Although calls for implementation of shari‘a rules were unsuccessful on both these occasions, they certainly did not end in the late 1960s. There have been four discernible Muslim constituencies demanding it in the aftermath of the New Order regime (1966–1998), namely Islamic political parties, certain regions with a majority of Muslim inhabitants, Muslim militant groups, and sections of the Islamic print media. Even though the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) in its annual session in 2002 decided not to amend the 1945 constitution to give shari‘a constitutional status, calls for the formal recognition of shari‘a continue (Abuza, 2007, p. 1).

B. Historical Memory of Seven Words: The Past in the Present Indonesia

The emergence phenomenon of the demands of some Muslims to restore the seven words of the Jakarta Charter, with the obligation to practice the shari‘a for its adherents” are deleted and replaced with "belief in one God" is very interesting to observe. Perhaps the founding father deleting the seven words was not only to maintain the integrity of new nation-state Indonesia, but also give equality to all citizens has never predicted that the decision to remove the seven words of the Jakarta Charter would be a crucial issue that will continue to haunt the history of Indonesian as nation-state.

If we try to trace the historical records on the elimination of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter, then we will find a variety of responses that indicate a discourse reproduction concerning such elimination. For the religious nationalist groups, the removal is not an important issue, because what important for this group is not a form of Islamic state, but how Islam, as well as other religions, can be a spirit in the life of the nation. But the Islamists' response to the removal was very different. They considered that the removal of seven words is the anti-Islamic conspiracy and concrete manifestation of the defeat of Islam.

Regardless of whether the historical perception of and response the Islamism group to the elimination of seven words is true or not, the seven word certainly is remarkable influence on the life of Indonesia nation-state, especially the relation between the nationalists and religious nationalists in one side and Islamist groups in other side. Seven words of the Jakarta Charter here transform to be myth and rites that greatly affect the lives of the Indonesian people. Myth, as said by Eliade, is the truth history. In this context, it is not important the history happened or not, but the point is the effect of the history.

As myth and rites, seven-word of Jakarta Charter is to be collective or social memory among Indonesian society. The concept of collective or social memory has
clearly become central to understanding “how groups retain a sense of the past, and …. how a sense of the past can inform a group’s politics, religions, art, and social life in general. The role of personal memory is also important in shaping and transforming past experience, and its functioning equally problematic (Zurbuchen, 2005, pp. 6-7). By quoting Wolff (2001) words, Zurbuchen said that memory is a story teller, and like all storytellers it imposes form on the raw mass of experience. It creates shape and meaning by emphasizing and leaving others out. Personal narratives brought into the public sphere also transform other, with sometimes terrible result (Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 7). Jakfar Umar Thalib, for example, criticizes the New Order regime and secular rule. He said, “We don’t like Pancasila because it means that Islam is the same as other religions. This is not so. We believe that Islam is the highest religion and the best.” He even argued that “There is no way for Muslims to get respect from non-Muslims except through jihad.” (Abuza, 2007, p. 68)

From the collective or social memories perspective we can understand why the omitting seven-word of Jakarta Charter emerges the sprit among Islamism groups to struggle continually creating Islamic state. Islamism groups read and interpret the process of the omitting seven-word of Jakarta Charter as a result of betrayal to the Islamic struggle by some people in that time, such as Soekarno, Moh Hatta, Wachid Hasyim, Kasman Sigodimedjo, and Teuku Hasan. By producing “the social or collective of hate” through online media, printed publishing, and “rumors”, the “myth” of seven-word success to keep the spirit of Islamism groups to change Indonesia to be Islamic state never died even though the regime is always trying to diminish them.

In producing social or collective memories, determining factor is not only the fixed texts or other emerging “sites of memory”, but also process of configuring memory, moment when the past can be reshaped and outcomes remain unresolved (Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 8). From this we will know and understand how the Islamism groups in Indonesia spread their ideas about seven-word and try to create their idea, such as rebellion, underground movement, religious terrorism, etc. By using this perspective, we will understand why Islamism groups used some ways in realization their idea.

Starting from this knowledge, we should understand the model of their struggle. This knowledge is importance to discontinue the constructing process of social or collective of hate awareness. At moment when societies change direction—whether sudden or prolonged, through violent upheaval or more peaceful rebalancing of power—representation of the past may disappear, be transformed, and acquire or lose authoritativeness (Zurbuchen, 2005, p. 8). From this perspective we can look
forward how to make the power of social or collective of hate awareness among Islamism groups are reduced.

C. Religion and State Relation: Islamic Perspective

In order to present more clearly the political ideas of Indonesian Muslim, here I will briefly discuss the relation between religion and state. Generally speaking, according to Faisal Ismail (Ismail, 1995, pp. 40-50), the relation between religion and state can be classified into three major theories. The first is that the state and religion should not be separated, since Islam, as an integral and comprehensive religion, covers both worldly and other worldly life. The constitution of the state should therefore be officially based on Islam. The supporter of this theory, such as Abu A’la Mawdudi, Hassan Al Banna, Sayyid Qutb, and other religious of the Ikhwanul Muslimin and Jamaah Islami. The second is that religion and the state should be separated, and religion confined to private affair. There should be no interference by religion in affair of the state. The constitution of the state should not be based on Islam, but on secular ideas. The first and the second kinds of state-religion relation actually also happened in Indonesian history, but like we know it always failed. However, the first until today always attempt to create their idea. And the third is theory proposes a formal separation between religion and state where in the state’s constitution is not officially based on Islam, but the state still pays attention to or tackles religious issues.

To give more clearly debate relation between religion (Islam) and state in early Indonesian Independent era, we can trace it by following debate between Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, the leader of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII) and Mohammad Hatta, the secular nationalist (Noer, 1990) and the first vice president. Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, the leader of the Indonesian Islamic Union Party (PSII), advocated that Islamic courts not only must remain but should also be strengthened through the provision of better-educated and government-paid judges. Moreover, their original jurisdiction over inheritance, which was transferred to the state court in the Dutch colonial period, should be restored. Above all, Abikusno not only defended the formal existence of the Islamic religious advisers, but also “argued forcefully for granting the Islamic umma its full due, which amounted to something very close to an Islamic state” (Lev, 1972, p. 37). For Abikusno and other Muslim leaders, Islam could only survive and grow stronger and be fulfilled as a religion if it had the state behind it.

Meanwhile, on the relationship between religion and the state, Hatta’s stance was certainly different from that of the Islamic groups who argued that no separation between the private and public spaces in Islam. According to Hatta, “we will not establish a state with a separation of religion and state, but a separation of religious
affairs and state affairs. If religious affairs are also handled by the state, then the religion will become state equipment and . . . its eternal character will disappear. State affairs belong to all of us. The affairs of Islam are exclusively the affairs of the Islamic ummah and the Islamic society (Lev, 1972, p. 37).

D. The Jakarta Charter: Ideological Compromise

In early 1945, there was already hot debate over the character of the future Indonesian state between Islamic and nationalist leaders in the Sanyo Kaigi (Advisers Council), an official body of the Japanese government. At the first round of meetings of the BPUPKI, which lasted from late May to mid-July 1945, both contending camps were openly confrontational in debating the basis for the new state of Indonesia. Three speeches of the nationalist group, presented by Muhammad Yamin, Soepomo, and Soekarno on 29 May, 31 May, and 1 June respectively, argued that the Five Principles (the Pancasila) would be the foundation of Indonesia. Although these three speeches were slightly different in formulating what should constitute the Five Principles, they shared a similar opinion that the Indonesian state should not be solely based on Islam.

Among these three speeches, the most detailed one was Soepomo’s. Unlike Yamin and Soekarno, Soepomo explained more specifically what a non-Islamic state of Indonesia would look like. Having analyzed various theories of states in the world history, Soepomo came up with the idea of the state that requires “the unity between the leader and his/her people and the unity of all in the state” (Yamin, pp. 110-114). However, as Soepomo emphasized, this kind of state was not meant to deny the interests of various groups or individuals in the society. Instead, “it recognizes and respects those interests in the sense that groups and individuals should be conscious that they are an organic part of the state totally and feel obliged to strengthen the unity and harmony among those parts” (Yamin, pp. 114-115).

Criticizing the idea of an Islamic state propounded by the speakers from the Islamic groups, Soepomo highlighted the importance of the unitary model for the new independent state of Indonesia. For Soepomo, there were differences between “an Islamic state” and “the state that is founded on the high ideals of Islam.” In the former, “the state cannot be separated from religion. State and religion are one, a whole” (Yamin, p. 115). To create this Islamic state, according to Soepomo, would mean “not setting up a unitary state,” but “the state that is going to link itself to the largest group, the Islamic group” (Yamin, p. 117).

Soekarno, who delivered his speech the day after Soepomo, underscored further the possibility of Islam giving its high ideals to influence the direction of a national unitary state. In this national state, according to Soekarno, Islam finds fertile soil, for “this is the best place to promote religion.” Islam can be defended by “mutual
agreement, achieved by deliberation, namely in the Parliament” (Yamin, pp. 74-75) (Boland, pp. 22-23).

The counterarguments of the Islamic groups during this first round of the BPUPKI meeting came from Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, the leader of Muhammadiyah (Hadikusumo S. K.). In his remarks, presented on 31 May 1945, Hadikusumo demanded the establishment of a state on the basis of Islamic principles for two reasons (Hadikusumo, 1997, p. 101). First, he claimed that Islam is strongly embedded at the heart of the Indonesian people. Addressing an audience that was mostly of the nationalist camp, Hadikusumo challenged them to look into the people’s hearts to discover what actually resided there. What was to be found, according to Hadikusumo, was that the majority of Indonesian people would have Islam in their hearts. Second, Hadikusumo mentioned that the fight against the colonial Dutch, which Muslims mostly initiated, was an incentive for Islam to be a formal religion in the new state (Hadikusumo, 1997, pp. 102-104).

Responding to the idea of national unity presented by the nationalist group, Hadikusumo quoted various Qur’anic verses (Q.3:103 and Q.5:2) implying that Islam is an effective device to achieve strong unity (As quoted in Syaifullah, p. 106). It seemed, for Hadikusumo, that Islam has been the largest and the most important part of the unity of Indonesia for a long time. He apparently assumed that the unity of Indonesian people under Islam was naturally identical to the national unity of Indonesia. Accordingly, Hadikusumo saw no serious obstacle to the establishment of an Indonesian state based on Islamic principles.

There was no immediate consensus from this first round of the BPUPKI meeting. Instead, nine members were chosen to look for a solution to the increasing tension between the nationalist and Islamic camps regarding the basis of the new state of Indonesia. They were Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, A. A. Maramis, Achmad Subardjo, Muhammad Yamin, Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso, Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Agus Salim, and Wahid Hasjim. The first five represented the nationalist camp, while the rest represented the Islamic groups (Abikusno and Agus Salim were from Sarekat Islam; Abdul Kahar Muzakkir from Muhammadiyah, and Wahid Hasjim from Nahdlatul Ulama) (Bolland S. , pp. 25-26) (Anshari, p. 10). It is importance to note that A. A. Maramis was the only one of non-muslim representative in that forum, while the others were Muslim. The representative of the groups, after a long and tense debate, reached a historical political compromise, or gentlemen’s agreement, in the form of what Yamin called the Jakarta Charter. In this Charter Soekarno’s Pancasila was reformulated to read as follow:

1. Belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic shari’a.
2. Just and civilized humanity.
3. The unity of Indonesia.
4. Democracy which is guided by inner wisdom in unanimity arising out of deliberation among representatives, and
5. Social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.

At the meeting on 22 June 1945, these nine leaders managed to arrive at a compromise. The nationalist group had an assurance from the Islamic group that the state of Indonesia would not be based on Islam, while the Islamic group received a concession from the nationalist group that the practice of Islamic shari‘a would be obligatory for Muslim citizens. This compromise, later well-known as the Jakarta Charter, constitutes the ‘seven words’ *dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya* [with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic shari‘a] inserted in the formulation of the Pancasila as part of the preamble of the 1945 constitution (Bolland S., p. 27).

The compromise reached in the form of the Jakarta Charter was not, however, the final consensus. This temporary consensus then had to be brought to the second round of the BPUPKI meeting (10–16 July 1945) for deliberation by all BPUPKI members. On the second day of the meeting (11 July 1945), three members raised objections to the Jakarta Charter. The first was Latuharhary, a Protestant representative from Maluku, who demanded its revision, since it could have a big impact on other religions and might create difficulties with customary law (*adat istiadat*). The other two members were Wongsonegoro (a liberal Javanese) and Hoesein Djayadiningrat (the first Indonesian head of the Office for Religious Affairs during the Japanese occupation), who alleged that the Jakarta Charter would lead to religious fanaticism because Muslims would be forced to practice Islamic law. To Latuharhary’s objection, Agus Salim replied that the conflict between religious law and *adat* law was not new and in fact had been already resolved. He added that non-Muslim citizens did not need to worry about “[their safety,” because it was “not dependent on the power of the state, but on the tradition of the Islamic community, which includes 90 percent of the population (Yamin, p. 259).

In response to Wongsonegoro and Djayadiningrat’s objection that the seven words may create fanaticism because Muslims would be forced to apply shari‘a, Wahid Hasjim reminded the audience of the importance of the principle of mutual deliberation (*permusyawaratan*) in Indonesia and that therefore there would be no compulsion. He further contended that if some members considered these seven words were going too far, there were other members as well who regarded the Jakarta Charter as not going far enough (Yamin, p. 259).

The foregoing discussion shows that neither side was able to completely achieve its objectives. The Islamic groups failed to introduce Islam as a state ideology, while
the nationalists were disappointed that there were provisions in the constitution that Muslim citizens would be obliged to practice Islamic law and that to be eligible for the position of president of Indonesia, one must be a Muslim. Under these conditions, the inequality between citizens became clear, as Muslims were given more political rights and a higher status than others. For that reason, many non-Muslim citizens did not feel bound by the draft constitution and viewed themselves being discriminated against by these provisions. Consequently, the nationalists and non-Muslim leaders decided on a counter-manuever to reverse the situation.

The rapid political developments that followed the declaration of the independence of Indonesia (17 August 1945), especially those that occurred on the day after that, 18 August 1945, cracked the compromise reached in the Jakarta Charter and wiped out all concessions given to the Islamic groups. The seven words in the preamble as well as in the article on religion were deleted and replaced with “Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” (One Almighty God). In addition, the religious qualification for the president was withdrawn entirely from the constitution. The most important factor mentioned by many historians to describe this change was Hatta’s encounter with the Japanese navy (Kaigun) official on the evening of the day of independence, 17 August 1945 (Noer, 1987, pp. 40-41) (Anshari, pp. 54-56), in which Hatta was warned that Christians and the Protestants in the eastern islands of the archipelago would separate from the Republic of Indonesia if the seven words were included in the constitution. This threat to the unity of Indonesia directly changed Hatta’s stance over the compromise.

He promised that he would convey this message to the members of the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (PPKI) that would meet the next morning. After more than two hours of lobbying between Hatta and the Islamic groups (Hadikusumo, Wahid Hasjim, and Kasman Singodimedjo), the meeting of PPKI on 18 August 1945 revoked all decisions based on the Islamic groups’ demands made in the previous BPUPKI meetings. As Boland says: [the meeting] finally came to the conclusion that in fact Indonesia only could become and remain a unity if the Constitution contained nothing that was directly connected with Islam. Therefore, articles on Islam as the official religion of the state, the condition that the President must be a Muslim and “the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law” had to be removed (Bolland S. , pp. 35-36).

The new consensus of 18 August 1945 regarding the deletion of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter would become one of the most controversial issues in the history of modern Indonesia.
E. Seven-Word: Myth and Rites

It is important to discuss deleting the seven-word of Jakarta Charter because in Indonesian history we know that the seven words that have deleted being entrance point of Islamic fundamentalists groups to "accuse" Pancasila state. For this group, the elimination of seven words of the Jakarta Charter “with the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari’a for its adherents” is a betrayal to the struggle of Indonesian Muslims. Therefore, according to this group, Muslims are obliged to return the seven words that have removed whatever the ways.

The claim that the deleting of seven words of the Jakarta Charter actually need to be examined weather was the removal factually betrayal to the Indonesian Muslim struggle or not? If looking at the acquisition of Islamic parties in general elections since 1955 until 2009, we can make conclusion that Indonesian Muslims do not really want or do not even care about the seven words. If the Indonesian citizen is approximately 90% of civilian want an Islamic state or the application of Islamic Shari'a, Islamic parties will obtain a majority in episodes of general election. It turned out that if all the voices of Islamic parties are collected, their voices are still lower than the nationalist parties. This also happens after a new order, the 1999 elections; Islamic parties with a promise to establish an Islamic state or apply Islamic law did not get a significant voice. Even, in the 2009 general elections, the number of votes collected by Islamic parties become less and less, about 30% than nationalist parties. There are even some Islamic parties that sell the romance of the past and the struggle to restore seven word of the Jakarta Charter “with the obligation of carrying out Islamic shari’a for its adherents” got vote under electoral threshold (ET) 2.5%.

Seeing this fact, the question is why Islamism groups still continue to fight to restore the seven words of the Jakarta Charter? Even Islamism groups use many ways to implemented their idea, not only by using constitutional way, but also through unconstitutional ways, such as rebellion and religious terror (ahmad Salehudin, 2011). Why does it happen? In my opinion, it happened because the seven words have become myth and rites in the life of Indonesia today.

Myth and rites process was begun at 1949 when Sekarmaji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo and his Darul Islam military movement threatened Pancasila-Base state. Calling his army “the Indonesian Islamic army”, Kartosuwiryo took up arm and lead a violent revolt in West Java against central government. On August 7, 1949, he formally proclaimed the foundation of what he called the Islamic state of Indonesia, of which he proclaimed himself to be Imam. Later Karosuwiryo’s revolt was joined by Kahar Muzakkar (1921-1965) in 1952 in South Sulawesi where he also proclaimed the establishment of an Islamic state under Kartosuwiryo’s command. Moreover, a similar revolt brook out in Aceh in 1953 under leadership
Daud Beureueh which also posed trouble for the central government. All these movement contributed to the spread of disturbances in those areas where the rebellion began (Ismail, 1995, pp. 60-65).

Other rebellion also emerged in 1977 that was Hasan di Tiro separatist movement. This movement tried to establish an independent state called the “Free Acehnese State”. There was another movement called Komando Jihad (holy war command), which was led by H Ismail Pranoto (known as hispran). The komando Jihad committed acts violence and terror in many areas, such as Bukit Tinggi, Padang and Medan. Another rebellion group was led by Abdul Qodir Djailani who launched an anti-government shortly before the 1978 MPR session. Vigorously advocating what he called “the Islamic Revolutionary struggle pattern” (Pola Perjuangan Revolusioner Islam), Djaelani was arrested and imprisoned for two and half years. The longest lasting movement was that led by Warman who, like Hispran, called his movement Komando Jihad. This movement was operating almost two years, 1978-1980 (Ismail, 1995, pp. 200-201).

Another rebellion was led by the Imran Group, which attached the police office at Cicendo, Bandung on March 11, 1981 and then hijacked a garuda DC-9 flight from Jakarta, forcing it to land at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok. Imran called his movement the “Indonesian Islamic revolution Council” (Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia), struggling to overthrow Soeharto regime and transform it into Islamic rule (Ismail, 1995, pp. 200-201). Such kind of struggle in creating Islamic state or implementing Islamic rule still exists until present day. Some religious terror, such as Suicide Bali bombing in 2002, Suicide bombing at JW Marriot and Ritz Charlton hotel, Jakarta, riots and burnings churches in Temanggung, Central Java (8 February 2011); book bomb in Utan Kayu, East Jakarta which cut off the hands of a police officer (March 2011); suicide bombings by Muhammad Syarif Yosoefa in the mosque surrounding police station in Cirebon on Friday (15/4/2011); and burning Syiah Islamic Boarding School at Sampang Madura (December 29, 2011).

The effort Islamism groups to make seven-word as myth and rites are not only by using rebellion, but also “academic” ways, that is by questioning the deletion process of seven words. In 1970, Prawoto Mangkusasmita, a former leader of Masyumi Party, questioned why Agus Salim, Abiskuno Tjokrosujoso, and Kahar Muzakkir, were not invited to the preparatory committee meeting. Mangkusasmito could not see how a meeting which lasted such short time could have succeeded in achieving an agreement leading to the withdrawal all Islamic sentences from the preamble of the 1945 constitution and its body (Ismail, 1995, pp. 56-57). Long before Mangkusasmito raised his objection, however, Isa Inshary in the 1957 Constituent Assembly had already attached the outcome of the August 18, 1945 meeting, which all Islamic references were deleted, us unfair action carried out
through dishonest politic. The Muslims of Makusasmito’s time renewed their accusation against the secular nationalist of having imposed this unfair situation upon them, which they had to accept in the name of tolerance (Ismail, 1995, p. 57). The accusation against secular state that nationalist secular/religious is unfair in the process of deleting Islamic references is still produced and reproduced until present day. If tracing this theme in media online, like searching by using Google, we can find a lot of information about, according to Islamism group, “unfair” deleting process of the seven words.

What we need today is, in my opinion, how to resolve the main problem of “unfair” process in deleting seven words of Jakarta Charter. By using perspective of collective memories, what we need to resolve it is how to forgetting old memories and emerging new collective memories. Actually, if we are aware that the deletion of seven words have been emerging such kind of hate memories and “betrayal” action repeatedly, we actually have chance and opportunity to understanding the characteristic of hate memories. From this knowledge, we can make suitable decision how to reconfigure and reshaped memory of the past.

F. Conclusion

In this conclusion I just want to say that (1) the omission of seven word of Jakarta Charter is ideological compromise between Islamism group, Nationalist Islamic group, and nationalist secular. In this ideological compromise we should understand the deleting process of Islamic references in Jakarta Charter and later in the body of 1945 Constitution. As product of negotiation, of course the Jakarta Charter and the deleting of seven-word would not satisfy all of groups. However, its ways to satisfy all of groups.

(2) We should aware that the deleting seven word of Jakarta Charter is used by Islamism group to create an opinion that the process of deletion is unfair process of dishonest politic. This assumption is directly or indirectly forming collective or social memory that “Muslim” should be struggling to returning seven words whatever the ways are. In Indonesian history, it is to be big problem because this group is not only using constitutional ways, but also unconstitutional ways, such rebellion, religious terror, hijacking, etc. What we need, as Indonesian civilian, is to reshape and reconfigure the memory.
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